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RECENT DECISIONS
case that an independent contractor or his employees were seamen.
The Hoquiam, 253 Fed. 627 (C. C. A. 9th 1918); Johnson v. American
Hawaiian S. S. Co. 14 Fed. (2nd) 534 (1926).
This decision brings about a drastic change in the law regarding
maritime torts. The former rule was that by the general maritime law
the vessel owner was liable only for the maintenance, cure and wages of
a seaman injured by the negligence of a fellow servant. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 (1917); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
Steamship Co., Inc., 247 U. S. 372 (1918).
The Jones Act of June 5, 1920, changed the rule so far as seamen
were concerned and allowed them to recover compensatory damages.
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924); The Osceola,
189 U. S. 158 (1903); The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240 (1904); Chelentis
v. Luchenbach Steamship Co., supra.
Stevedores or longshoremen could not, before the principal case,
hold their employers responsible if the negligent act which caused his
injuries was that of a fellow servant. Cassil v. United States Emer-
gency Fleet Corporation, 289 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 9th 1923) ; The Hoquiam,
supra; The Daisy, 282 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 9th 1922) ; Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921); Carstensen v. Hammond Lumber Co.,
11 Fed. (2nd) 142 (C. C. A. 9th 1926).
In The Hoquiam, supra, in a very able opinion by Hunt, C.J., it
was said, "when we consider that the only class of persons mentioned
in the section (Sec. 20-Act of June 5, 1920) are seamen, it is proper
to read and understand the whole section by its ordinary grammatical
sense. The great purpose, the special need for protection of seamen,
was carried out by the statute; but we find no safe ground for extension
of its provisions to others not seamen." This seems to express the true
intent of the statute, even in view of what the Supreme Court has laid
down in the principal case. It is manifestly unsound to construe the
"Jones Act" as applying to stevedores and longshoremen. The whole
tenor of the Act is for the protection of seamen and has no reference in
any of its provisions to other maritime employments. It is submitted
that if Congress intended to include other employments, it would not
have restricted its language to "seamen."
COVENANTS-BREACH OF WARRANTY AS TO INCUMBRANCES-
DAMAGES.-This is an action by the plaintiffs to recover substantial
damages for a breach of the defendant's covenant against incum-
brances. The plaintiffs allege that the land in question was sold to
them by the defendant with a full covenant and warranty deed, but
that in fact, at the time of conveyance, there was an outstanding
mortgage on the premises. It appears that the mortgage was there-
after satisfied of record by the defendant. Plaintiffs appeal from a
judgment awarding them nominal damages. Held, judgment of nom-
inal damages affirmed by a unanimous opinion on the ground that in
a breach of a covenant against incumbrances the plaintiff may recover
nominal damages only, unless lie alleges and proves same special dam-
age. McShane v. Kilpatrick, 110 So. 281 (Sup. Ct. Ala., 1926).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The important question that arises in event of a breach of cove-
nant against incumbrances is the measure of damages to be awarded
to the plaintiff. In the principal case it was held that the burden
of proof is upon the plaintiff to show his damages and he must show
the actual discharge of the prior incumbrance. It follows that if the
alleged incumbrance was satisfied and removed by the moneys and
properties of the. grantors, in the conveyance in question, the plaintiffs
are only entitled to recover nominal damages by reason of the breach
that resulted from the execution and delivery of the conveyance. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff does suffer some special damage, viz.,
is evicted from the premises or is compelled to protect his title in a
direct attack against it, his recovery is not limited to nominal damages
only; and this seems to be the view of the weight of authority in
this country. Seldon v. Dudley Jones Co., 89 Ark. 234, 116 S. W.
217 (1909); re Hanlin's Estate, 133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411 (1907);
Copeland v. McAdory, 100 Ala. 553, 13 So. 545 (1893); Brantley v.
Johnson, 102 Ga. 850, 29 S. E. 486 (1897); Richmond v. Ames, 164
Mass. 467, 41 N. E. 671 (1895); Hunt v. Hay, 214 N. Y. 578,
108 N. E. 851 (1915). Prof. Williston in his work on contracts says,
however, "this (view) is illogical and at variance with the rule gov-
erning covenants to remove specific encumbrances or to pay debts, but
is practically convenient." 3 Williston Contracts (1920), Sec. 1402.
But in the case of Parkinson v. Woulds, 125 Mich. 325, 84 N. W. 292
(1900), though the grantee's possession had not been disturbed he
was permitted to recover the consideration he had paid.
.So it .has been held in McHargue v. Calchina, 78 Ore. 326,
153 Pac. 99 (1915), that an easement over land which was conveyed
by a full covenant and warranty deed was tantamount to a con-
structive eviction and a recovery was permitted for the value of that
part of the land in proportion to the purchase price. The same con-
clusion was arrived at by the New York Court of Appeals in the case
of Hunt v. Hay, 214 N. Y. 78, 108 N. E. 85 (1915), which held that
if a covenantee is kept out of possession by means of a superior
title, it is equivalent to an eviction and gives effect to the covenant,
and where there is a complete breach of covenant of warranty on the
sale of real property the damage is the value of the property at the
time of the covenant.
Now the question presents itself as to what should be the measure
of damages in the case of an actual or constructive eviction. Logically
the measure of damages should be the amount which would put the
plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been had the warranty
been kept. In fact, however, in most states he is allowed to recover
for the total loss of the property only the consideration which he
paid for it, with interest from the date of the sale. Hunt v. Hay,
214 N. Y. 579, 108 N. E. 851 (1915); McCormack v. Marcy, 165
Cal. 386, 132 Pac. 449 (1913); Webb v. Holt, 113 Mich. 338, 71 N. W.
637 (1897); Coleman v. Lucksinger, 224 Mo. 1, 123 S. W. 441 (1909);
Wetzell v. Rechcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N. E. 1004 (1895). Where
such an action is brought by another than the immediate vendee of the
warrantor the plaintiff's recovery is generally restricted to the amount
received by the warrantor with interest. 2 Sutherland, Damages (4th
Ed. 1916) 2125, Sec. 614. Under the prevailing rule, where the plain-
tiff is evicted from a. part of the land only his damage is such pro-
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portion of the consideration as the value of the land which he lost
bears to the whole consideration.
But in Connecticut and Massachusetts, Cecconi v. Rodden, 147
Mass. 164, 16 N. E. 749 (1888); Butler v. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399,
24 Atl. 328 (1892), the plaintiff is permitted to recover the value of
the improvements he put on the land; but it is submitted that this
rule is illogical for, at the time of the conveyance of the land the
records were open to both parties and a search thereof would have
disclosed the true owner and in such case, of two innocent persons,
neither should be made to suffer for the misfortune of the other.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE POWERS-ZONING REGULATIONS.
-The village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, passed the
zoning laws in question which provided for use, height and area dis-
tricts. Plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of the measure on the
ground that it is in derogation of the 14th amendment of the United
States Constitution in that the plaintiff is deprived of liberty and prop-
erty without due process of law and is denied the equal protection of
the law. Held, in the lower court judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff, reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court, with three justices dis-
senting, on the ground that zoning regulations are within the police
powers of the state and as such are valid when not arbitrary or
unreasonable. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep. (U. S.) 114 (1926).
Zoning regulations are an outgrowth of modern civilization, called
forth by the complexities of present day life. They may be divided
into two classes, namely, those regulatory in their nature and those
passed for aesthetic purposes. Cochran v. Preston, 180 Md. 220,
70 At. 113 (1908) ; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) .1163; Welch v. Swasey,
193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 214 U. S. 91 (1908). In the first class
are included the provisions restricting the height, use and location
of commercial and dwelling houses, in the second, regulations in refer-
ence to bill-boards, sky-signs, etc.
These ordinances, which twenty-five years ago, would have been
rejected as unconstitutional as an arbitrary abuse of power, are now
being generally sustained in most jurisdictions. In re Opinion of the
Justices, 235 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920): State v. City of New
Orleans, et al., 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920); City of
Aurora v. Burns, et al., 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925); State v.
Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N. XV. 569 (1925); Miller v. Board
of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); under the so-
called "police powers" of the state. For what once was a lonely
cow-path now is a broad highway, teeming with motor vehicles and
other conveyances, all inherently dangerous instruments. What once
was a small rural community now is a large city, pulsating with life
and all its problems, requiring more and better fire, police and other
protection. This rule is, therefore, not inconsistent with the former
one, for, while it is true that the meaning of the constitution cannot
be stretched, we must impart a certain sense of elasticity to its
application, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 47 U. S. Sup.
Ct. 114 (1926). If the rule were otherwise, the original purpose
